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SECRET ENCLOSURES  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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3/15/60

March 12, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. A. J. GOODFASTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Visit of Chancellor Adenauer

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I enclose a briefing book containing the substantive papers prepared for the visit of Chancellor Adenauer, who will be calling upon the President at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, March 15. I am also enclosing two cards outlining suggested points for the President to raise with the Chancellor and a suggested approach on the question of Germany and Berlin.

We will be forwarding Sunday a memorandum for the President from the Secretary enclosing a substantive background memorandum which summarizes the more important topics covered by the papers in the briefing book. We are forwarding a memorandum for the President on the Norstad Plan.

The Secretary will bring over on Monday morning a special memorandum on German vested assets which he and the Under Secretary wish to discuss with the President.

Hermann

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John A. Calhoun  
Director  
Executive Secretariat

Enclosures:

1. Briefing Book on Adenauer Visit.
2. Two Briefing Cards.



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**C.F.**  
CHANCELLOR ADENAUER'S VISIT  
Washington, March 14-17, 1960

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Briefing Book



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General Goodpaster

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SECRETCHANCELLOR ADENAUER'S VISIT  
Washington, March 14-17, 1960

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Position Paper

March 10, 1960

Germany and Berlin

(The U.S. Might Wish to Raise)

Recommended U.S. Position

The Western Peace Plan represents the best approach to a real solution of the problems of Germany and Berlin, and this Plan should be put forward again at the Summit. However, the Plan will certainly be rejected by the Soviet Union again, and a complete breakdown of negotiations would inevitably lead to an increasing aggravation of the Berlin situation and possibly to a grave crisis.

We are determined to maintain the Western position against Soviet unilateral action despite the serious risks involved. We have taken steps to provide the Federal Republic with information concerning the contingency planning of the three Western occupying powers. This planning shows both the gravity with which we would regard action by the Soviets in signing a peace treaty and turning over control of access checkpoints to the GDR as well as the many difficult problems of a practical nature with which such action by the Soviets would confront the Western Powers.

It seems unlikely that, at the forthcoming Summit meeting, agreement can be reached on a definite Berlin arrangement acceptable to the West. In such circumstances, the West must take advantage of every tactical opportunity to temporize until a more favorable situation for real negotiations develops. The Western Powers should try at the Summit to put the Soviet Union in a position in which it will not feel impelled to take immediately any action which fundamentally affects the Western position in Berlin. To do so, the Western Powers will probably have to offer the Soviet Union some inducement for the acceptance of such a delay. This, at a minimum, would involve some forum for continuing negotiations on Berlin. However, more will probably be necessary.

Since the Western Powers can accomplish their immediate purpose best by tactical flexibility, the pre-Summit Working Group on Germany including Berlin should attempt to develop for presentation to the Soviet Union a proposal for an arrangement in Berlin

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which might be acceptable to the Soviets as a basis for continued negotiations and which might involve superficial changes in procedure but otherwise maintain intact the essence of the Western position in Berlin.

Whether such an arrangement should contain certain elements of the Western proposals of July 28 at Geneva or approach the problem along different lines should be considered by the Four-Power Working Group and once its purely tactical purpose has been understood, can be further discussed by the four Foreign Ministers during their mid-April meeting. The Working Group should also examine the possibility of the West's making certain other proposals designed to take the initiative from the Soviets.

In short, while giving the Chancellor the most solemn assurance of our absolute determination to protect Berlin, we should state with equal firmness our unwillingness to accept a priori that the German interpretation of how this could be achieved must be controlling.

Anticipated German Position

The Western Powers should adopt a more aggressive posture in dealing with the questions of Germany and Berlin at the Summit. They should stress that the real problem is the continued division of Germany and should press for consideration of the Western Peace Plan. They should also propose a plebiscite on the peace treaty question, as suggested by the U.S. in the Washington Working Group.

The idea of an interim solution for Berlin is an illusion, for the concessions involved in such a solution will inevitably begin the erosion of the status of Berlin as an area under Allied occupation. The security and freedom of Berlin depends on the Western Powers' maintaining this status intact. No de facto recognition can be given to the "GDR". The Western proposal of July 28, 1959 involved great risks and must be regarded as withdrawn.

Only a firm and uncompromising stand by the Western Powers offers any chance of deterring the Soviet Union from action against Berlin.



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Discussion

Chancellor Adenauer will decide personally the German positions for the Summit preparations. He probably views these preparations with uneasiness and distrust. He suspects the British of being prepared to reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union at Germany's expense, for example, through the de facto recognition of the GDR, and he fears that the U.S. is being more and more influenced by British thinking. On the other hand, he knows he has the solid support of the French for an attempt to maintain the status quo at all costs.

A partial explanation of the German rejection of the idea of changes in the status of Berlin may be that the Germans are over-confident about the ability of the Western Powers to maintain the status quo intact and to deter the gradual erosion of the Western position. There is as yet no evidence that the President's attempt, at the Western Summit in December 1959, to bring the Chancellor to think about where an inflexible position on Berlin could lead has had much effect on German thinking. We are now trying to give the Germans a better basis for appraising the probable consequences of failure to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on Berlin by acquainting them in general terms with tripartite Berlin contingency planning. However, the information on this subject which we have been able to give them to date is limited, and the Chancellor may have had only cursory briefing on the subject by the time of his visit.

It is very unlikely that the pre-Summit Working Group on Germany including Berlin will begin making much headway in elaborating a Western position until some weeks after the Chancellor's departure. The only positive contribution of the Germans to the work of the Working Group to date, except for rigid insistence on the maintenance of the status quo in Berlin, is approval for the suggestion of an all-German plebiscite on the peace treaty question. However, this is only a tactical proposal designed to emphasize the underlying issue of the right of self-determination. It is not likely either to be accepted by the Soviet Union or to divert the Soviet Union from a new effort to terminate the Allied occupation of Berlin.

After first maintaining only that the Western Geneva proposals of July 28, 1959 for an interim agreement on Berlin represented the farthest limit to which the Western Powers could go, the Germans subsequently introduced in the Working Group a paper which stressed the dangers of such an agreement. If the Germans are unwilling to give further consideration to the July 28, 1959

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proposals, the Working Group might examine some other possibility, for example, a series of unilateral declarations to establish a modus vivendi under which the "GDR" might exercise present Soviet functions with respect to Allied access, but the Western position in Berlin, including Western access rights, would remain as they are and their continuing validity would be recognized by the Soviet Union. Such a proposal was included in the London Working Group report of April 1959 but was never approved by the Western Governments.

The immediate purpose of raising the Germany and Berlin question with the Chancellor during his visit is to impress on him the desirability of a certain degree of flexibility for tactical purposes alone and of the importance that the German delegation in the Working Group be instructed to examine seriously the possibilities of trying to find a suitable tactical arrangement rather than rigidly insisting that nothing in Berlin may be changed.



Drafted by:	Cleared by:
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	EUR - Mr. Davis
	S/B - Mr. Bohlen (in substance)
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March 9, 1960

CHANCELLOR ADENAUER'S VISIT  
Washington, March 14-17, 1960

Position Paper

Summit Preparations on East-West Relations  
(The U.S. Might Wish to Raise)

Recommended U.S. Position

The Chancellor might appreciate being brought up-to-date on the progress of the Working Group on East-West Relations. (The Germans are not formal participants in this phase of summit preparations; they are informally represented on the London subgroups on East-West Trade and East-West Contacts, but not on the over-all group in Paris or its subgroups on "non-interference" and aid to underdeveloped areas.)

Though we realize that Khrushchev will probably raise some general questions of East-West relations at the summit and though individual Western participants will undoubtedly wish to make statements on this subject, we ourselves are placing less emphasis on this aspect of summit preparations than on preparations for the more immediate subjects of disarmament and Germany including Berlin. In general, the French approach to this aspect of summit discussion has been more ambitious than ours; they tend to see the summit as a great debate between East and West, while the British and ourselves have tried to take a more pragmatic view of the risks of being tied up in ideological argumentation with the Communists. However, we do attach importance to the summit as an opportunity to make clear to Khrushchev and to other Soviet leaders the incompatibility of any real prospect of orderly and peaceful evolution of the world with their concept of coexistence.

Anticipated German Position

Unknown; likely to be similar to ours.

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Discussion

As the Chancellor will know, the London subgroup on Trade has tentatively concluded that there is little reason at this time for summit discussion of increase in trade with the USSR. In the overall East-West Working Group in Paris, the French have proposed some principles to govern the East-West relationship which might be proposed at the summit. We have suggested that the group confine itself to the more limited task of working out a definition of "peaceful coexistence" which would make it clearer to world opinion what the Soviets mean when they use this phrase, and that we attempt to direct discussion of the East-West relationship away from misleading generalities and toward actual Soviet doctrine and practice.

In the light of past experience, we have also expressed our doubts to the French as to the feasibility of a workable definition of "non-interference" which would really have some effect in limiting Soviet propaganda or Soviet direction of foreign Communist parties. We have taken a similar position as to the feasibility of a French proposal to limit export of arms to certain areas in Africa and the Near East, pointing out that the Soviets would almost inevitably seek to apply the idea to Middle Eastern countries to which the West is allied through NATO and CENTO. We have also stressed the risks of a French proposal to consider the merits of collaboration with the USSR on joint projects for aid to underdeveloped areas, pointing out that such a practice, in the unlikely event the Soviets were to accept, would confuse our friends and might facilitate access for the Soviets to areas they cannot now easily reach. In varying measure, the French proposals described also touch on the question of a possible East-West "world directorate" or of "spheres of influence" agreed with the Soviets -- both concepts we wish to avoid.

The British have also supported the more pragmatic position on all the points mentioned. We believe that we will go to the summit adequately prepared on this subject matter, prepared to counter illusions that the summit somehow marks a fundamental change or new departure in Soviet policy.



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CHANCELLOR ADENAUER'S VISIT  
Washington, March 14-17, 1960

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March 10, 1960

Position Paper

Summit Preparations: German Participation

(The U.S. Might Wish to Raise)

Recommended U.S. Position

Since the Germans have tended to blame the United States for what they consider to have been organizational changes derogating from the Federal Republic's role in summit preparations, it might be desirable to reaffirm to the Chancellor the importance which the United States attaches to the Federal Government's contribution to, and overall importance in, preparations for the East-West summit. This is reflected in the considerable efforts we have expended to assure a special role for Germany in the preparations for the meeting in May.

We recognize the importance of the German problem, including Berlin, in any present-day negotiations with the Soviet Government. It is clear that these matters determine in large part Khrushchev's attitude toward other questions.

It is for that reason that we have insisted on continuance of the quadripartite Western Heads of Government forum preliminary to the East-West confrontation. Our attitude in this regard has been made clear to those governments which have tended to aspire to a more prominent role in the summit preparations. Such changes as were made in the organizational pattern preparatory to the summit were acceded to by the United States only in response to insistent pressures from other NATO allies and even then only when we were assured that the special role of Germany in the ultimate preparatory phase would remain as heretofore.

The rather complicated arrangements made for the April Foreign Ministers meetings were devised with just this thought in mind. A further indication of our feelings in this regard is the agreed meeting of the four Foreign Ministers prior to the beginning of the NATO Ministerial session at Istanbul early in May. Similarly, we continued to support a four Power Steering



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Group until it became clear that in the face of strong and vocal dissatisfaction among some of our NATO allies further insistence could only be harmful to the position of the Federal Republic within the alliance.

As regards the preparatory work now in progress, the Working Group on Germany including Berlin, of which the Federal Republic is a member, is functioning smoothly and should be able to make a significant contribution to the summit preparations particularly as the date of the summit grows near. The United States supported arrangements for informal Federal Republic collaboration in the work of the London Sub-Group on East-West Relations which deals with the two aspects of this topic which we understood to be of primary interest to the Federal Republic.

Finally, there is the subject of disarmament where the organizational structure of the preparatory work was, in effect, predetermined by earlier decisions. While we have been and would be prepared to consider other institutional devices to ensure that the German position on disarmament is given adequate consideration, we feel that at this stage normal diplomatic channels can best be utilized. The Federal Republic can be assured that the United States will consult them fully with regard to developments in the disarmament preparations, as evidenced by the arrangements made during the Washington phase for regular briefings of the German Embassy, and will take special account of German interests in those aspects of disarmament which might affect European security and other measures affecting Europe specifically.

Anticipated German Position



The Germans are known to be dissatisfied with the extent of their participation in disarmament preparations, and specifically with the brief hearing given Ambassador Grewe by the Five-Nation Disarmament Group while meeting in Washington; this is especially so since the Chancellor believes the West should attempt to follow a tactic of deliberately emphasizing the importance of disarmament in order to distract attention from the German unity and Berlin problems and diminish public pressure for concessions on them. At the same time, he has always been mistrustful about Western disarmament preparations, fearing that the West might reach agreement with the Soviets on such topics as troop withdrawals or prohibition of stationing nuclear weapons in a context where he has no direct voice and without a link between progress in disarmament to progress in solution of the German question. The Germans are also dissatisfied, though less acutely, with their limited participation in the East-

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CHANCELLOR ADENAUER'S VISIT  
Washington, March 14-17, 1960

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March 10, 1960

Background Paper

High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridors

Summary

In March and April 1959, the United States Air Force conducted three flights (two scheduled and one unscheduled) in the Berlin corridors at altitudes above 10,000 feet, the level which the Soviets have been arguing for some years is a ceiling above which we have no right to fly. Since that time we have had continuously under review within the United States Government and with the British and French the question as to whether it was yet operationally necessary or desirable to resume such flights on a regular schedule. There is complete tripartite agreement that whenever such circumstances obtain the flights should be made. However, a review following the President's return from South America revealed that such operational requirement does not now exist.

Discussion

It is unfortunate that press speculation on the issue arose during the President's recent trip, leading the public to believe that the matter was some sort of "cold-war" exercise. Our continuing review of the question has been based exclusively on the premise that if such flights are to be conducted, it must be because they are operationally and logistically justifiable.

We have publicly reasserted our right to fly at any altitude in the Berlin corridors without previous notification to the Soviets. This continues to be the position of the United States, Great Britain and France. When and if such flights become operationally and logistically necessary or desirable, they will be made.

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West preparations. The Germans were quite disappointed at the dropping of the Steering Group concept. These points will provide the background for a possible indication of concern from the Chancellor on procedural aspects of participation in summit preparations.



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